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Abstract  
The Grid is a promising concept to solve the dilemma of increasingly complex and demanding 
applications being confronted with the need for a more efficient and flexible use of existing resources. 
Network-centric Grid Operating Systems (OS) aim at providing users and applications with 
transparent and seamless access to heterogeneous Grid resources across different administrative 
domains. Scheduling in these heterogeneous environments becomes the key issue since scarce 
resources must be distributed between strategic and self-interested users. Market-based algorithms 
are deemed to provide a good fit to the Grid environment by accounting for its distinct properties and 
the needs of the users. Current market mechanisms, however, leave room for inefficiency and are 
computationally intractable. The speed of heuristics becomes a desirable feature in interactive, large-
scale Grid OS settings. Heuristics achieve a fast, approximately efficient allocation of resources but 
generally fail in preserving truthfulness, i.e. users can benefit from cheating the mechanism. The 
contribution of this paper is the proposal of a greedy, market-based scheduling heuristic for network-
centric Grid OS which does achieve this distinct trade-off: it is designed so as to obtain an 
approximately efficient allocation schedule at low computational cost while accounting for strategic, 
self-interested users in a heterogeneous environment. 
Keywords: network-centric Grid OS, market-based scheduling, heuristic, truthful 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Grids allow the aggregation and sharing of a wide variety of geographically dispersed computer 
resources owned by different administrative units (Foster and Kesselman 2004). Grids are typically 
used for scientific applications that require massive amounts of computational power and storage such 
as protein folding, weather forecasts, or gene encoding. These applications potentially process and 
store terabytes of data and the sharing of resources is necessary to reduce the enormous processing 
time (Berlich et al. 2005; Cirne et al. 2006). The most famous predecessor of modern Grids is 
SETI@home which connected in its peak time over one million computers spread across 226 countries 
to achieve processing power of 418.6 TFLOPS (Cirne et al. 2006). For comparison, the world’s fastest 
supercomputer – IBM’s BlueGene/L system – has an estimated total processing power of 280 
TFLOPS, while Google's search engine system can muster between 126 and 316 TFLOPS. Grids offer 
enormous potential by aggregating idle resources that are geographically distributed. For businesses, it 
is projected that Grids may reduce total IT costs by 30 % (Minoli 2004). 
The use of market mechanisms has often been suggested in situations that establish a price for 
resources. The price being paid to resource owners that share idle resources reflects the scarcity of the 
provided resource. Since consuming resources is not for free, demand will be restricted and shifted to 
those time slots where the resources are really needed. The employment of market mechanisms in 
distributed computing is not new. The first attempt was reported at Harvard University where auctions 
were used to allocate computing time to users of the PDP-1 computer (Sutherland 1968). Other 
examples are Tycoon, Bellagio, and Nimrod/G (Buyya et al. 2000; Lai et al. 2004). 
From an economic point of view, the use of market mechanisms in Grid computing is promising, but 
most of the potential in state-of-the-art Grid middleware such as Globus, UNICORE, and gLite is 
being wasted. Current Grid middleware is based on the premise to share idle resources only and 
computational jobs are submitted to these idle resources where they are being processed in batch 
mode. It would be more efficient to allocate all available resources over markets. Ideally, resource 
allocation should be on-demand such that interactive processing of jobs is permitted as well (Gorlatch 
and Müller 2005).  
Recently, a new stream of research on network-centric Grid operating systems (OS) has emerged in 
Grid computing that especially addresses interactive applications. Network-centric Grid OS provide 
the user with seamless and transparent access to Grid resources such as memory and computing 
power. While current OS provide only limited support for Grid computing, network-centric Grid OS 
adjust their view on the system at run-time contingent upon the particular resources. By means of 
network-centric Grid OS, the Grid can be used in an interactive manner. This interactivity certainly 
raises problems concerning bandwidth and latency – network-centric-Grid OS are an active research 
topic (Padala and Wilson 2003; Gorlatch and Müller 2005). Nonetheless, there are currently some 
implementations available that come close to this notion of a network-centric Grid OS. MOSIX, for 
example, is realized as an OS virtualization layer that provides a single system image with the Linux 
run time environment to users and applications. As such, it allows applications to run on remote nodes 
as if they ran locally. Users can run their applications while MOSIX is automatically and transparently 
seeking resources and migrating processes among nodes in order to improve overall performance 
(Barak et al. 2005). 
The concept of network-centric Grid OS coupled with markets is deemed promising to revolutionize 
resource allocation in Grids. From their conception, network-centric Grid OS do not only allocate 
resources being idle but all available resources. The employment of markets for allocating and 
scheduling jobs to resources appears promising to achieve an efficient resource allocation in the 
economic sense – allocating those jobs to the resources that value it most.  
The problem of scheduling resources is, however, computationally demanding. To be harnessed for 
network-centric Grid OS, market mechanisms needs to be solvable quickly. Currently, there is no 
market mechanism available that is specifically tailored towards the needs of a network-centric Grid 
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OS. This paper seeks to remedy this gap by designing a truthful scheduling heuristic for MOSIX that 
achieves an approximately efficient allocation fast. The contributions of this paper are threefold: 
Firstly, the paper designs a multi-attribute exchange that can be used for Grid OS. Secondly, a greedy 
heuristic is employed to solve the scheduling problem. Thirdly, an adequate pricing scheme is 
developed which assures that reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for resource requesters and 
payments to resource providers are approximately truthful. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the market-based scheduling 
problem of network-centric Grid OS systems is introduced. Section 3 suggests (i) a heuristic to solve 
this problem and (ii) a pricing scheme that provides the market mechanism with desirable properties. 
Section 4 discusses related work in the light of the presented market mechanisms. Section 5 concludes 
the paper with a summary and points to future work. 
2 MARKET-BASED SCHEDULING IN GRID OS  
There are two classes of system users in network-centric Grid OS: Resource requesters who want to 
use the computing resources offered in the system for solving a computational problem and resource 
providers who want to sell idle resources. We introduce the term “job” to refer to a computational 
problem and we will call an atomic bundle of resources on which the job or parts of it can be 
computed a “node”, e.g. one server within a cluster. If a job gets allocated to a node, we will call this 
job (node) a “winning” job (node). We intend to design a direct, sealed-bid mechanism which 
allocates periodically: the mechanism collects resource requests and offers from the users for a period 
of time and then allocates jobs to nodes on the basis of these submitted requests and offers. Users do 
not get to know the requests and offers submitted by other users before the allocation is determined by 
the mechanism. 
2.1 Economic Requirements 
The mechanism is intended to perform job scheduling in a distributed computing environment with 
heterogeneous and selfish users. There are a number of economic requirements which a market-based 
scheduling mechanism should ideally satisfy in this environment (Schnizler et al. forthcoming): 
• Allocative efficiency: A mechanism is said to be allocatively efficient if it maximizes the 
utility across all participating users (welfare), i.e. the sum over the valuations of all winning 
resource requesters less the sum over the reservation prices of all winning resource providers. 
• Budget-balance: the mechanism does not need to be subsidized by outside payments. The 
payments coming from the resource requesters cover the payments made to the resource 
providers. 
• Computational tractability: the mechanism can be computed in polynomial run time in the 
size of its input, i.e. the number of resource requests and offers. 
• Truthfulness: it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for users to reveal their true valuations to the 
mechanism. 
• Individual rationality: users cannot suffer any loss in utility from participating in the 
mechanism, i.e. it is individually rational to participate. 
Budget-balance and individual rationality are hard constraints which the mechanism must suffice. If 
these two requirements are not met, the mechanism will not be sustainable. Truthfulness is a desirable 
feature since it tremendously simplifies the strategy space of the users; there is no need to reason about 
the strategies of other users. Due to the celebrated impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite 
(1983), this inherently implies that allocative efficiency can only be approximated: There is no 
exchange which is at the same time budget-balanced, individually rational, truthful and allocatively 
efficient in equilibrium. 
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There are three basic components to be designed: the bidding language which defines how requests 
and offers are specified, the allocation algorithm which decides which job is to be executed on which 
node at what time, and the pricing scheme which translates the resulting allocation schedule in 
corresponding monetary transfers. In this section, the bidding language and the winner determination 
problem will be formalized. The complexity of this scheduling problem forms the rationale for a 
market-based heuristic. The pricing scheme will only be specified for the heuristic due to the focus of 
this paper. 
2.2 Bidding Language 
There is on-going research on applying machine learning, regression and filtering techniques for 
predicting run times of future jobs (Ali et al. 2004). In many cases a certain resource requester will 
submit jobs to a distributed computing environment which are similar in terms of algorithms, data 
structures, job size etc. Thus the run time of a new job is likely to follow the run times of “similar” 
jobs in the past. Building on this research we will assume that the resources needed for the 
computation of a job are known to the requester a priori. This comprises the amount of computing 
power, memory, and the run time of the job. A resource requester wanting to compute a job j submits a 
request (bj, cj, mj, sj, ej) to the market mechanism where bj ∈ ℜ+ denotes the requester’s willingness to 
pay per unit of computing power and time slot, cj ∈ℵand mj ∈ ℵ the minimum amount of computing 
power and memory, sj ∈ ℵ the time slot at which the job needs to be started, and ej ∈ ℵ the time slot 
until which the job needs to be run. A job can only be executed in its entireness (atomicity). It cannot 
be parallelized on multiple nodes but migrate across different nodes over time. Note that job migration 
is one of the main features which distinguish Grid OS in general and MOSIX in particular from 
traditional machine scheduling domains. A resource offer containing node n consists of a tuple  (rn, c¯n, 
m¯n, εn, λn) where rn ∈ ℜ+ denotes the reservation price per unit of computing power and time slot, c¯n ∈ ℵ and  m¯n ∈ ℵ the maximum amount of computing power and memory, and εn ∈ ℵ and λn ∈ ℵ the 
earliest and the latest time slot at which the resources are available. Contrary to atomic resource 
requests, resources offered by some node are divisible and moreover freely disposable. 
Example: The following resource requests and offers have been submitted to the system: 
Job j  bj cj mj sj ej Node n  rn c¯n m¯n εn λn 
J1 11 60 50 2 3 N1 5 150 100 1 5 
J2 10 80 50 1 3 N2 7 100 120 2 6 
J3 9 90 100 2 5 N3 8 140 100 1 5 
J4 8 130 100 4 5       
J5 7 80 90 1 3       
J6 6 70 50 2 4       
J7 5 30 40 1 3       
Table 1. Sample resource requests and offers. 
Job J1 requests to be run in time slots 2 and 3 and requires at least 60 units of computing power and 50 
units of memory in each time slot. The resource requester for job J1 is willing to pay up to $11 per unit 
of computing power and time slot, i.e. $11 * 60 * 2 = $1,320 in total. The provider of node N1 offers 
at most 150 units of computing power and 100 units of memory in time slots 1 to 5 and requires a 
minimum payment of at least $5 per unit of computing power per time slot.  
To simplify notation, in the following we will assume that each request and each offer has been 
submitted by a separate user and we will use the terms request and job (offer and node) 
interchangeably. In contrast to Schnizler et al. (forthcoming), this bidding language does not support a 
combinatorial exchange where users can request and offer arbitrary sets of goods and possibly link 
multiple requests and offers by means of logical operators. In the scenario at hand, each request and 
offer specifies one and the same bundle of computing resources and memory and thus rather 
implements a multi-attribute exchange (Bichler et al. 1999) by allowing the specification of multi-unit 
bundles, e.g. 100 units of computing power and 50 units of memory. Note, however, that while the 
bidding language is not combinatorial, the scheduling problem of allocating jobs to nodes remains a 
combinatorial assignment problem as will be seen below. 
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2.3 Exact Scheduling 
Exact mechanisms such as the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism are guaranteed 
to find an optimal solution to the scheduling problem. Let N be the set of nodes contained in resource 
offerings, J  the set of jobs contained in resource requests, TS(n) := {t ∈ ℵ | εn ≤ t ≤ λn} the set of time 
slots in which node n ∈ N is available according to the respective resource offering, Tb(j) := {t ∈ ℵ | sj 
≤ t ≤ ej} the set of time slots in which job j ∈ J requests to get executed, and N(j) := {n ∈ N | Tb(j) ⊆ 
TS(n), cj ≤  c¯n, mj ≤ m¯n} the set of nodes which can potentially execute job j. We introduce the binary 
decision variable xjnt ∈ {0,1} with xjnt = 1 if job j will be executed on node n in time slot t and xjnt = 0 
otherwise. The scheduling problem can be formalized as the following mathematical integer 
programme: 
[SP] 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
max : ( )
. . {0,1}, , ( ), ( ) ( 1)
1, , ( ) ( 2)
, , ( ) ( 3)
, , ( ) ( 4)
( 1) , ,
b
jnt
j jnt j nj J t T j n N jx
b
jnt
b
jntn N j
S
jnt j nj J
S
jnt j nj J
b
jnu j j jntn N j
V c x b r
s t x j J t T j n N j C
x j J t T j C
x m m n N t T n C
x c c n N t T n C
x e s x j J t T
∈ ∈ ∈
∈
∈
∈
∈
= −
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
≤ ∈ ∈
≤ ∈ ∈
≤ ∈ ∈
= − + ∈ ∈
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑
∑
∑( ) ( ) ( ) ( 5)
, , ( ), ( ) ( 6)
bu T j n N j
b
j jnt n
j C
b x r j J n N j t T j C
∈ ∈
≥ ∈ ∈ ∈
∑ ∑
 
SP assigns jobs to nodes as to maximize welfare V. The economic scheduling scenario is encoded in 
the constraints of this combinatorial assignment problem as follows: (C1) introduces xjnt as binary 
decision variable. Jobs can only be assigned to nodes which provide the necessary resources during the 
right time slots. (C2) ensures that a job is allocated to at most one node at a time. (C3) and (C4) 
specify that for any given time slot and node, the total resource consumption in terms of memory and 
computing power cannot exceed the resources provided by this node. (C5) defines atomicity, i.e. every 
job is either executed as a whole or it is not executed at all. (C6) ensures that for each allocation of a 
job to a node, the requester’s willingness to pay is equal to or greater than the provider’s reservation 
price. The optimal allocation schedule X* := (x*)j∈J,n∈N,t∈Tb(j) yielding welfare V* can be derived 
directly from the solution to SP. 
Example: For the sample resource requests and offers listed in Table 1, building and solving SP yields 
the optimal allocation schedule X* shown in Figure 1. In time slot 1, only job J2 runs on node N1. The 
requester of job J2 is willing to pay up to $10 [per computing cycle] * 80 [computing cycles] = $800 
per time slot. The provider of node N1 requires a minimum payment of $5 per computing cycle and 
time slot and receives – depending on the pricing which will be elaborated below –  at least $5 * 80 = 
$400. Thus the allocation of job J2 to node N1 in time slot 1 yields welfare of $800 - $400 = $400. 
Across all time slots, X* generates welfare of V* = $3,420. 
Exact
scheduling 
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6
J1
J2
J1
J2J2 Node N1
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6
J3 J3 J3 Node N2
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6
Node N3
J3
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J4 J4
 
Figure 1. Optimal Allocation Schedule. 
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While this exact mechanism generates an optimal allocation schedule in terms of economic efficiency, 
this optimality only comes at the expense of computational efficiency: SP is an instance of a multiple 
knapsack problem (Ferrari 1994) and thus NP-hard. Computational costs of determining the allocation 
and the pricing may become a problem in dynamic network-centric Grid OS with a large number of 
resource requests and offers (Waldspurger et al. 1992). In these settings, a trade-off between efficiency 
and computational complexity may be desirable to support interactive applications. 
3 TRUTHFUL SCHEDULING HEURISTICS 
Heuristics aim at obtaining a good but generally suboptimal (in terms of welfare) allocation fast. 
Relaxing allocative efficiency not only impacts the outcome determination but also the pricing 
scheme: compromising a mechanism in terms of allocative efficiency generally implies compromising 
truthfulness as well (Mu’alem and Nisan 2002). Lehmann et al. (2002) and Mu’alem and Nisan 
(2002), however, elaborate necessary and sufficient conditions that do yield truthful, approximating 
mechanisms for a restricted class of users: known single-minded bidders. Informally, a bidder (user) is 
known single-minded if she only desires one specific set of goods and this set is known to the 
mechanism. Applying these conditions to the scenario above in order to design a truthful mechanism 
suggests itself: in a non-combinatorial multi-attribute exchange such as a market-based scheduler for 
Grid OS, resource requesters and providers are only allowed to request and offer one single bundle of 
resources corresponding to the bundle of attributes – in the scenario at hand this is computing power 
and memory. 
3.1 A Greedy Scheduling Heuristic 
Lehmann et al. (2002) and Mu’alem and Nisan (2002) propose greedy heuristics for constructing 
truthful heuristics for single-unit combinatorial auctions with one seller and multiple buyers. We build 
on this proposal and apply this greedy principle to construct a heuristic for the multi-attribute Grid 
exchange at hand with multiple sellers and multiple buyers. This heuristic consists of two basic 
phases: 
1. Sort the requests j ∈ J and offers n ∈ N in non-increasing and non-decreasing order with 
respect to some norm η; 
2. Sequentially run through the resulting rankings and allocate the requests with the highest 
ranking to the offers with the highest ranking (cf. pseudo code in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Heuristic for obtaining the initial allocation. 
The allocative efficiency of this greedy heuristic essentially hinges on norm η used in the sorting phase 
(Lehmann et al. 2002). This norm must lead to “efficient” rankings in the sense that the heuristic can 
create an approximately efficient allocation based on these rankings. A straightforward choice is to use 
bi and ri respectively as these set the valuation for a job (node) in relation to the amount of resources 
requested (offered). In conjunction with the sequential allocation rule in phase two, the resulting 
heuristic truly implements a greedy allocation algorithm: in each allocation step, it intends to 
maximize bj – rn from the objective function of SP above. 
(1) Sort jobs j ∈ J in non-increasing order and nodes n ∈ N in non-decreasing order of η. 
(2) Run sequentially through the job ranking, starting with the highest ranked job. For each job j: 
(3)  Run sequentially through the node ranking, beginning with the highest ranked node, and 
check if j can be executed, i.e. whether conditions (bj ≥ rm) ∧ (cj ≤ c¯m)  ∧ (mj ≤ m¯m) are 
satisfied for some m ∈ {n1,...,nj} ⊆ N, i.e. the nodes with the highest ranking which can 
together accomodate job j, in time slots t ∈ Tb(j). 
(4) If so, allocate j to {n1,...,nj}; Update the residual capacities of m ∈ {n1,...,nj}, i.e. subtract 
mj from m¯m and cj from c¯m in time slots t ∈ Tb(j). 
(5) Continue at (2). 
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Example: Assume η = bj, j ∈ J, and η = rn, n ∈ N.  
Job j  bj cj mj sj ej  Node n  rn c¯n m¯n εn λn 
J1 11 60 50 2 3  N1 5 150 100 1 5 
J2 10 80 50 1 3  N2 7 100 120 2 6 
J3 9 90 100 2 5  N3 8 140 100 1 5 
J4 8 130 100 4 5        
J5 7 80 90 1 3        
J6 6 70 50 2 4        
J7 5 30 40 1 3        
Figure 3. Example of the greedy heuristic. 
Jobs J1 and J2 can be fully executed on node N1. In time slots 2 and 3, job J3 does not fit on N1 but 
only on N2 which is next in the ranking. In time slots 4 and 5, J3 does fit on N1. Since J3 is allocated 
to N1 in time slots 4 and 5, J4 does not fit on N1 anymore but only on N3, in contrast to the optimal 
allocation X*. In total, Xgreedy yields welfare Vgreedy = $3,000 and an approximation ratio of Vgreedy / V* = 
$3,000 / $3,420 ≈ 88 %. The greedy heuristic generates the following allocation schedule Xgreedy : 
Heuristic 
scheduling 
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6
J1
J2
J1
J2J2 Node N1
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6
J3
J3 J3
Node N2
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6
Node N3
J3
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7 J4 J4
 
Figure 4. Greedy allocation schedule. 
The question is: How can these allocations of requests to resources and vice versa be translated into 
corresponding monetary transfers (prices and payments) according to the desired design criteria 
introduced above? Mu’alem and Nisan (2002) and Lehmann et al. (2002) propose a pricing scheme 
which generates truthful prices in restricted one-sided, combinatorial auctions with one provider and 
multiple requesters. In the remainder, these theoretical results will be applied to the Grid OS context to 
generate truthful prices for resource requesters. In contrast to the setting of Mu’alem and Nisan (2002) 
and Lehmann et al. (2002), the Grid OS market consists of multiple requesters and multiple providers. 
An algorithm will hence be proposed which yields approximately truthful payments to resource 
providers. 
3.2 Critical Value-based Pricing of Resource Requests 
Following the spirit of the truthful Vickrey auction, the payment of job j corresponds to its critical 
value given sets J and N of jobs and nodes (Lehmann et al. 2002, Mu’alem and Nisan 2002). The 
critical value of φ j is the minimal valuation that j has to report in order to remain in the allocation 
schedule, keeping all other requests and offers unchanged. Note that it is not possible to simply take 
the valuation of the job with the highest ranking which does not get executed since this job may not be 
executable in general due to capacity constraints. Moreover, removing j from the winning allocation 
might change the allocation of other jobs within the winning allocation as well. To determine the 
critical value for each winning job j, we need to determine the allocation without j: we successively 
allocate all other jobs from the ranking and, after having allocated a job, check whether j can still be 
accommodated (cf. pseudo code in Figure 5). 
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 Figure 5. Determining the critical value of job j and refining the initial allocation. 
The critical value must be computed once for each winning job j. However, compared to the 
computational intractability of the VCG mechanism, the computation now runs in polynomial time. 
Every winning job j has to pay pgreedy,j = (ej – sj + 1)cjφj whereas every rejected job pays nothing. 
Example: Applying the algorithm to the example above, we get pgreedy,J1 = (eJ1 – sJ1 + 1)cJ1φJ1 = 
120·bJ7 = 120·rN1 = $600, i.e. the “cheapest” option for job J1 is to push away J7 by bidding $5 (plus 
some ε) which happens to equal the minimum reservation price of node N1. In total, the mechanism 
collects a revenue R of $6,400 from the resource requesters. 
Job j J1 J2 J3 J4 
φj 5 5 7 8 
pgreedy,j 600 1,200 2,520 2,080 
Table 2. Payments of resource requesters. 
The greedy allocation scheme combined with critical-value based pricing creates a truthful scheduling 
heuristic with respect to resource requesters: It is a weakly dominant strategy for resource requesters 
to report their true valuation for a job (the required resources). The payment depends on the critical 
value which is independent of the reported valuation. Assume a risk-neutral requester j has reported 
her true valuation vj, i.e. bj = vj. Then there are four cases to be considered.  
State\Action Decrease bj Increase bj 
j was accepted Case 1 Case 2 
j was rejected Case 3 Case 4 
Table 3. Proof sketch. 
Suppose j has won. Reporting a lower valuation (Case 1) might have resulted in j not being accepted 
while it would not have reduced j’s payment. Reporting a higher valuation (Case 2) would not have 
generated more utility either since j has been accepted anyways. 
Now suppose j has been rejected (φj > bj = vj). Reporting a lower valuation (Case 3) would still have 
left j outside the winning allocation. Reporting a higher valuation (Case 4) might even have resulted in 
a loss: if j had been accepted, bj > φj > vj. 
3.3 Budget-balanced, Approximately Truthful Payments to Resource Providers 
The concept of critical value-based pricing cannot be applied when determining the payments for 
divisible resource offers. The concept requires a binary decision in the sense that an offer is either 
fully executed or it is not executed at all. We allow divisibility of offers, i.e. not all offered resources 
need to be used but the offer can be executed partially.  
(1) Sort jobs k ∈ J, k ≠ j, in non-increasing order and nodes n ∈ N in non-decreasing order of η. 
(2) Is any job k ≠ j left in the ranking?  
If not, set φj = 
1{ ,..., )
max
jm n n m
r∈  where {n1,...,nj} are the nodes with the highest rankings 
which can together accommodate j, and finish.  
If so, select job k with the highest ranking. 
(3) Can k be accommodated? If not, continue at (2). If so, allocate k to the nodes {n1,...,nk} ⊆ N 
with the highest ranking that can accommodate k, and update the residual capacities of m ∈ 
{n1,...,nk}. 
(4) Can j still be accommodated on some nodes {n1,...,nj} ⊆ N? If not, set φj = bk and finish. 
(5) If so, set 
1{ ,..., )
: max
jm n n m
r r∈= . Either r < bk, then continue at (2); or r ≥ bk, then it is cheaper 
for j to push away k than to take the next available nodes {n1,...,nj}; set φj = bk and finish. 
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The algorithm for determining the critical values ensures that each winning job pays at least the 
reservation price of the node it is allocated to. If there is competition from another job for the same 
slot, the critical value will exceed the reservation price. The question is: How can revenue R be 
distributed to the resource providers so as to ensure budget-balance, individual rationality and to 
approximate truthfulness? The VCG mechanism is generally not budget-balanced (Schnizler et al. 
forthcoming) and, combined with the heuristic above, not truthful (Mu’alem and Nisan 2002). A 
straightforward approach is to adopt the algorithm of Parkes et al. (2002) to our greedy heuristic. The 
basic idea of their algorithm is to approximate the VCG mechanism’s truthfulness by computing 
discounts Δparkes that minimize the distance to the VCG-discounts Δvick while ensuring budget-balance.  
In our algorithm, we first compute Δtemp,n  := Vgreedy –  (V–n)greedy for each winning node n. The 
underlying assumption is that the greedy Δtemp,n (which may in total exceed the surplus                    
R – ∑n∈Nv^n(X
greedy) from the request-side) approximate the truthful VCG-discounts Δvick,n. We then 
solve the mathematical programme 
[BBgreedy] 
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The aim of BBgreedy is to compute discounts Δgreedy,n as to approximate Δtemp,n in turn while ensuring 
(strong) budget-balance by distributing the surplus R – ∑n∈Nv^n(X
greedy)) to resource providers (C7).  
Parkes et al. (2002) suggest and examine various distance functions analytically and numerically and 
recommend the “threshold function” L2(Δtemp, Δgreedy) := ∑n∈N (Δtemp,n – Δgreedys,n)
2 as it minimizes the 
“residual degree of manipulation freedom” (Parkes et al. 2002), that is the maximum amount of utility 
a user can gain from reporting untruthfully. Analogously to the algorithm of Parkes et al. (2002), the 
optimal Δgreedy,n can be computed without explicitly having to solve the non-linear programme BBgreedy. 
Let ∞ = Δtemp,0  ≥ Δtemp,1 ≥ Δtemp,2 ≥ … ≥ Δtemp,|N| ≥ Δtemp,|N|+1 = 0 be the partial ordering over the 
temporary greedy discounts for the winning nodes. Then, for the threshold function L2, Parkes et al. 
(2002) show that there is an interval K and a unique point Ct* within this interval such that 
( )( ),1*
, 1 , ( 9)
ˆK temp ii
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and Δgreedy,n = max{0, Δtemp,n - Ct*} solves BBgreedy. Node n receives a positive discount if n’s temporary 
greedy discount is greater than the threshold Ct*. Otherwise n does not get any discount. Ct* can be 
computed by running sequentially through the partially ordered temporary discounts and checking if 
condition (C9) is satisfied. 
Example: In the example, R = $6,400 > $6,040 = ∑n∈Nv^n(X
greedy), i.e. there are $360 above the 
reservation prices which are to be distributed as to approximate truthful payments. Solving BBgreedy 
with distance function L2 leads to Ct* = $1,680 and the greedy discounts listed in Table 4. The total 
surplus of $360 is allocated to node N1, N2 and N3 only receive payments amounting to their 
reservation prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Approximately truthful greedy payments. 
Node n v^n(Xgreedy ) (V–n)greedy ptemp,n Δtemp,n pgreedy,n Δgreedy,n 
N1 -2,700 960 -4,740 2,040 -3,060 360 
N2 -1,260 2,820 -1,440 180 -1,260 0 
N3 -2,080 3,000 -2,080 0 -2,080 0 
Σ -6,040  -8,260 2,220 -6,400 360 
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3.4 Evaluation of the Heuristic 
The greedy heuristic is designed so as to obtain approximately efficient allocations fast. It runs in 
polynomial time in the size of resource requests and offers: In the first phase, requests and offers get 
sorted in O(|J|·log |J|) and O(|N|·log |N|). In the second phase, the greedy allocation scheme 
sequentially runs through the |J| sorted requests and for each job j tries to allocate j to one of the |N| 
sorted offers. Hence the allocation phase runs in O(|J|·|N|). Note that the feasibility of allocating a 
specific job to a specific node can be tested in O(1) since the number of attributes which need to be 
checked is constant. Inherently, this speed is only achieved at the expense of allocative efficiency 
compared to exact mechanisms. In a theoretical worst case analysis, the approximation of the efficient 
allocation can be made arbitrarily bad with respect to norm bj , rn suggested above by means of simple 
examples. The pricing scheme of the greedy mechanism consists of two parts: a truthful pricing 
scheme for resource requesters and an approximately truthful payment scheme for resource owners. 
BBgreedy links these two sides as to ensure budget-balance. The resulting prices are individual rational; 
a user reporting her true valuation will not have to pay more than her reported valuation if her request 
gets accepted and she will not have pay anything if she does not obtain the resources, and accordingly 
for resource owners. 
4 RELATED WORK 
The study of market mechanisms for Grid and the implementation of running Grid market prototypes 
have received significant attention in the past. SPAWN (Waldspurger et al. 1992) implements a market 
for computing resources in which each workstation auctions off idle computing time to multiple 
applications by means of a Vickrey auction. All resources are allocated to at most one application at a 
time regardless of this application’s actual demand which yields low resource utilization. Chun and 
Culler (1999) realized a prototpyical market for computing time in which one resource provider sells 
computing time to multiple requesters. Resource requesters get allotted computing time proportional 
to their share in the total reported valuation across all requesters. The POPCORN market (Regev and 
Nisan 1998) is an online market for computing power which implements a Vickrey auction as well as 
two double auctions. All of these approaches share two major drawbacks: First, they allow the 
specification and trading of computing power only. But requesters require a bundle of resources such 
as computing power, memory, and bandwidth. On the one hand, the approaches at hand thus lead to 
inefficient allocations since requests with the same demand for computing power but different 
memory requirements, for instance, are treated the same.  On the other hand, requesters are exposed to 
the risk of only being able to obtain one leg of the bundle of required resources without the other 
(“exposure risk”, Schnizler et al. forthcoming). A second limitation of these approaches is that they do 
not support reservations of resources in advance which are essential for Quality of Service assertions. 
Schnizler et al. (forthcoming) propose a comprehensive model that targets these deficiencies. They 
suggest the use of a multi-attribute combinatorial exchange (MACE). Users are allowed to request and 
offer arbitrary bundles of grid resources and can specify quality attributes on these resources. MACE 
implements an exact mechanism. The scheduling problem in this combinatorial setting is NP-hard, the 
pricing scheme of MACE yields approximately truthful prices. With truthful prices, strategic users do 
not have an incentive to report any valuation other than their true valuation. Due to the NP-hardness of 
the problem, the mechanism is adequate for batch applications – the use for interactive applications is 
rather limited. 
The work of Bapna et al. (forthcoming) is most relevant to the work presented in this paper. In their 
model, multiple requesters and providers can trade both computing power and memory for a sequence 
of time slots. First, Bapna et al. (forthcoming) introduce an exact mechanism. By introducing fairness 
constraints and imposing one common valuation across all resource providers, they structure the 
search space in the underlying combinatorial allocation problem as to establish one common, truthful 
price per time slot for all accepted requests. Additionally, this introduces a linear ordering across all 
jobs and time which reduces the complexity of the allocation problem, which however still remains 
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NP-hard. To mitigate this computational complexity, they thus propose a fast, greedy heuristic at the 
expense of both truthfulness and efficiency. 
Archer et al. (2003) also design a heuristic on the basis of Mu’alem and Nisan (2002) and Lehman et 
al. (2002) which, however, cannot be applied to the Grid OS context since multiple items of resources 
are traded, such as x computing cycles. The truthfulness of their mechanism, however, only holds for a 
small number of items. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
In Section 1, we argued that a network-centric Grid OS coupled with market-based scheduling can 
increase efficiency in Grid and cluster environments by adequately allocating all available resources. 
This distinguishes network-centric Grid OS from state-of-the-art Grid middleware such as Globus, 
gLite, and UNICORE which rely on batch processing of idle resources only. While there are highly 
sophisticated market mechanisms available for Grid middleware (e.g. MACE), there are no 
mechanisms available for network-centric Grid OS which rely on interactive application processing. In 
Section 2 we formalized the market mechanism as a multi-attribute exchange in which resource 
owners and consumers can publish their demand and supply. Exact market-based scheduling 
mechanisms share one deficiency: they are NP-hard. While this may not be a problem in a cluster 
setting with a small number of users, it may prove crucial in an interactive, large-scale Grid OS 
environment. We thus proposed a greedy heuristic in Section 3 which performs a fast scheduling while 
preserving truthfulness on the request-side and approximating truthfulness on the provisioning-side of 
the market. In Section 4, we presented related work on market-based resource allocation in Grids. 
In essence, our market mechanism suggests several intriguing research avenues. We intend to 
implement a prototype of the heuristic for dynamic scheduling in MOSIX, a state-of-the-art Grid OS 
presented in Section 1. Numerical analyses need to be performed to further analyze the heuristic’s 
properties with respect to the economic and technical requirements in Grid OS. The approximation of 
efficiency needs to be compared to the optimal allocation achieved by exact mechanisms. This ratio 
essentially depends on the norm used in the ranking phase of the heuristic. More sophisticated norms 
will be developed and analyzed. The run time of the presented scheduling mechanisms needs to be 
evaluated to determine the critical number of requests and offers at which an exact mechanism might 
become infeasible and to determine the speedup achieved by the heuristic. And finally, the 
approximation of truthfulness on the provisioning-side of the market needs to be analyzed. It is 
desirable to allow users to specify dependencies between resources, such as substitutability of 
computing power for memory. The model in this paper hence needs to be expanded to allow for such 
extended bidding logics. 
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